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Professors András Sajó and Andrew Arato have pointed out a crucial problem: how
can constitutionalism be restored if the unified opposition wins the Hungarian general
election in Spring 2022? The topic is of crucial relevance regarding that even if
the opposition wins, it probably cannot achieve a two-thirds majority in parliament
which is required to amend the current constitution or adopt a new one. The seven
questions raised by the two professors are based on the presumption that, on the
one hand, the current Hungarian Basic Law lacks proper democratic legitimacy and
that it is inconsistent on the other. From this starting point, they concentrate on the
options of how a new constitution could be adopted without a two-thirds-majority in
parliament. I argue that the above presumptions are not entirely correct. First, “extra-
constitutional constitution making” will not lead us out of the rule of law crisis but is a
danger to the rule of law itself. Second, the main shortcoming of constitutionalism in
Hungary is not caused by the text of the constitution but by the electorate. In addition
to both of these points, I will also briefly sketch what the European Union should
(not) do.
How flexible is the concept of democratic
legitimacy?
“Is a democratic community bound to follow constitutional rules of dubious
democratic nature?” – ask Sajó and Arato referring to the adoption of the current
Basic Law in 2011, exclusively with the votes of Fidesz-MPs and without any
substantial debate or compromise with the opposition. Yet, even though there has
been a lack of dialogue and transparency, the enactment was formally in line with
the rules of constitution-making which required a two-thirds majority in parliament;
describing this process as of “dubious democratic nature” is a huge exaggeration.
 The way the new constitution was prepared might not be elegant, but it certainly
was not illegitimate. Following the logic of Sajó and Arato, the German constitution
would also be of “dubious democratic nature” as the Grundgesetz came into
existence under the control of the occupying allied powers and was intended to be
provisional. Or, staying with the example of Hungary, the former constitution, which
was completely rewritten at the time of the democratic transition, would be similarly
dubious from this point of view because the participants of the Round Table Talks
and the communist parliament lacked democratic legitimacy. The current Hungarian
Basic Law, by contrast, was adopted by a parliament that was legitimised by a two-
thirds majority of the (active) electorate.
But there is also another question of the two professors worth considering.
Related to the idea of a constitutional referendum, they ask “what kind of popular
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participation would legitimize extra-constitutional constitution-making”. The answer
is simple: a two-thirds majority – not at a referendum (since a referendum cannot be
held on constitutional topics pursuant to the Basic Law), but at the general election
so that constitution-making will not be extra-constitutional at all.
Overriding the rules of the former constitution upon the creation of a new one might
be acceptable after revolutions or at transitions from dictatorship to democracy. In
Hungary, this is not the case. The Orbán-regime is not a dictatorship – not least a
victory of the opposition in the upcoming election would prove this.
Exceptional methods should be applied only in exceptional times. Once we accept
“extra-constitutional” constitution-making after normal elections and a regular change
of government, nothing would guarantee that the rules of constitution making will
not be simply overridden right after the next election. If, in effect, something further
weakens the rule of law, it is constitution-making every four years.
Why doesn’t the Hungarian constitution function?
I do agree with Professors Arato and Sajó, however, that some parts of the
Hungarian Basic law are incompatible with each-other. But I think the much more
serious problem lies with the constitution. Apart from the inconsistency of the Basic
Law, which is mainly the result of later amendments, often motivated by the daily
political interest of the governing party, the Basic Law essentially reflects basic
principles of liberal democracy, both regarding institutions and fundamental rights.
The real problem is that the constitution does not function. And this has less to
do with its text but with constitutional practice. It is a problem of those who are
supposed to operate the constitutional system: public administration officials who
simply ignore applicants, prosecutors who are reluctant to investigate certain cases
of corruption, and constitutional judges who regularly avoid substantial decision-
making in politically delicate cases. And, of course, there is the political elite that
continues to suggest that laws and constitutional principles do not necessarily
apply to all in the same way. This problem has been known in Hungary since the
democratic transition, but it has become much more serious and visible in the last
eleven years when the government has often used personalised legislation to favour
friends and punish enemies.
This general problem can be solved neither by textual changes to the constitution
(or by an entirely new one), nor by dismissing the entire Constitutional Court or parts
of the public administration. (The opposition has already mentioned the dismissal of
constitutional judges and other leading officials as a realistic option.) The demand for
constitutionalism and legal certainty must stem from society. A society that lacks that
claim, cannot be changed from one day to another.
In a country where a government that systematically undermines the rule of law
and restricts institutional independence is re-elected twice, the main shortcoming of
constitutionalism is not caused by the text of the constitution but by the electorate.
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This is certainly good news for the opposition, in so far as voters will probably not
punish them for pondering over “extra constitutional” constitution-making. They
simply will not care. The danger, however, is that society might further split into two
camps and that one part of the country will obey the new rules, while another the old
ones. The outcome could easily be chaos: precisely the opposite of the rule of law.
If the current opposition really wants to strengthen constitutionality in the long term,
it should first set an example for the people. For instance, they could show real
respect for constitutionalism by keeping the constitution, which was not respected
even by its creators, as the Fidesz-government often did not comply with the
constitution or amended it along immediate political interests. Of course, the Basic
Law should be corrected at some points. For example, it should be guaranteed
that the Constitutional Court does its job instead of avoiding or delaying substantial
decision making and the rules of referenda should be less restrictive, particularly
regarding the high validity threshold and the long list of prohibited subjects. As such
reforms aim at counterbalancing the power of the parliamentary majority, they are in
the interest of the opposition (of Fidesz, if they are defeated) as well, so it will not be
impossible to reach the required two-thirds majority for them.
What should the EU (not) do?
Unlike the Hungarian people, the EU deals a lot with the rule of law in Hungary,
even if the several resolutions, reports and the stalled Article 7 TEU procedure have
mostly been useless. Now, the Commission is about to launch the new rule of law
conditionality mechanism against Hungary, which may result in the suspension of
payments of EU funds.
And this is another trap for the opposition. Whether they will govern or not,
opposition-led local governments will also suffer from the lack of EU-funding which is
crucial for the development of villages and towns.
At the same time, a future government will face difficult decisions if the restart
of payments is bound to institutional changes that require a two-thirds majority
in parliament. Such a scenario must not be an excuse for overriding national
procedural rules of legislation while alluding to the restoration of the rule of law.
The Commission and other EU institutions should be aware of their responsibility:
they cannot encourage the government of any member state to disrespect
the constitution, and neither should they sit back silently if that happens. If the
constitution-making and amending by Fidesz with their legally obtained two-thirds
majority counted as illegitimate, constitutional revision with a simple majority
cannot be acceptable. If the sudden redesign of institutions gave reason for serious
concern eleven years ago, it cannot be welcomed now. If nepotistic practices were
scandalous, a witch hunt cannot be in order.
During the last eleven years, the government has illustrated many times how
repulsive it is when politics forms law in its own image. The promised “new transition”
should not begin by repeating this failure.
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